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Distracted Driving: How Technological
Advancements Impede Highway Safety
Amy L. Brueckner*
1. INTRODUCTION
Traffic safety has long been a concern of the United States' legal
system.' In 1966, the passage of the Highway Safety Act and the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act empowered the federal
government with the authority to "set and regulate motor vehicle and
highway standards."2 Subsequent improvements in automotive design
resulted in a decline of vehicle-related deaths.3 Despite these promising
consequences, not all safety requirements were readily embraced.4
One of the most controversial requirements involved safety restraint
systems, namely seatbelts.' Although vehicles came equipped with
seatbelts, drivers and passengers retained the discretion to buckle up or
not.6 Misconceptions about the benefits of seatbelts thwarted the federal
government's efforts to encourage seatbelt use.7 Eventually, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Association proposed that automotive
manufacturers equip every vehicle with "an automatic restraint system."
State legislatures followed suit and began enacting mandatory seatbelt-
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2011; B.A., The University of Michigan, 2008. The author would like to
thank her parents, grandparents, and close friends for their encouragement and support
throughout the writing of this Comment.
1. See Toni Gantz & Gretchen Henkle, Seatbelts: Current Issues, UNIV. OF
BERKELEY TRAFFIC SAFETY NEWSLETTER 1 (2002), available at
http://www.preventioninstitute.org/component/jlibrary/article/download/id-355/127.html.





7. Id Common misconceptions included that "seatbelts would prevent occupants
from escaping if their vehicle went underwater or caught on fire," and that "the additional
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use laws.9 Today, every state, except New Hampshire, has a law
requiring all vehicle occupants to wear a seatbelt.'o
Although seatbelt-use laws proved to be one victory in the
promotion of highway safety, new hurdles have emerged. Recently,
distracted driving has become a pressing safety concern, especially as it
relates to the use of cell phones." In fact, text messaging while driving
has been deemed the modern-day form of drunk driving.' 2  The
manifestation of the dangers posed by cell phone use while driving has
ignited a vehement response by federal and state legislatures.' 3 Much
like the passage of seatbelt use laws, opposition to laws prohibiting cell
phone use while driving exists, and the best methods for enforcement
remain an ongoing obstacle.14
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the evolution of
distracted driving, its ramifications upon society, and solutions to
ameliorate this pressing problem. Distracted driving is a broad concept
encompassing various acts.'5 However, this Comment focuses mainly on
the use of cell phones, including the act of text messaging, to analyze the
distracted driving problem.
Part II of this Comment defines and explains distracted driving.
Part II also uses statistics to demonstrate how pervasive the distracted
driving problem has become. Additionally, Part II presents a survey of
various state laws and proposed federal legislation, both of which seek to
remedy the dangers caused by the use of cell phones while driving.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the proposed federal
legislation and suggests ways to improve certain provisions. Next, Part
III presents a new method of preventing distracted driving as an
alternative to traditional avenues for resolving highway safety issues.
Part III then considers criticisms of the new text messaging while driving
laws, including problems with enforcement. Part III also discusses a
recent United States Supreme Court decision addressing Fourth
Amendment issues arising from the use of electronic devices, and the
effects that decision will have upon laws prohibiting text messaging
while driving.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4.
11. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
AN EXAMINATION OF DRIVER DISTRACTION AS RECORDED IN NHTSA DATABASES 1
(2009), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811216.pdf (providing data
demonstrating the increased number of accidents involving driver distraction).
12. See Matt Richtel, U.S. Withheld Data Showing Driving Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/technology/21distracted.html.
13. See infra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV of this Comment reflects upon the current problems
associated with laws prohibiting text messaging while driving, and
concludes with considerations for addressing distracted driving concerns
into the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Distracted Driving?
Distracted driving occurs when a driver "is delayed in the
recognition of information needed to safely accomplish the driving task
because some event, activity, object, or person within or outside the
vehicle compels or induces the driver's shifting attention away from the
driving task."1 6 Distractions emerge in various forms, including "visual,
something that takes your eyes off the road; cognitive, something that
takes your mind off the road; or manual, something that takes your hands
off the wheel of the vehicle."' 7 The critical feature that defines distracted
driving is "the presence of a triggering event." 8  Some common
examples of driving distractions include eating, drinking, and tuning the
radio.1 9 One of the most prominent and prevalent forms of distracted
driving, however, involves the use of cell phones.20
B. A Statistical Overview
The proliferation of cell phone use has been dramatic; over 270
million people in the United States today have cell phone subscriptions.2 1
While cell phones provide several obvious benefits, including improved
communications and internet access, these electronic devices have also
16. JANE C. Surrs, DONALD W. REINFURT, LOREN STAPLIN & ERIC A. RODGMAN,
THE ROLE OF DRIVER DISTRACTION IN TRAFFIC CRASHES 3 (2001), available at
http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/distraction.pdf.
17. JESSE WHITE, DISTRACTED DRIVER'S TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 3 (2008),
available at http://www.sos.state.il.us/departments/drivers/traffic-safety/ddtaskforce
finalreportO8.pdf.
18. SuTrS ET AL., supra note 16. "[A] triggering event distinguishes a distracted
driver from one who is simply 'lost in thought."' Id.
19. See Cyber Drive Illinois, Distracted Driving, http://www.sos.state.il.us/
departments/drivers/trafficsafety/distracted.html (last visited Nov 17, 2009) (listing
several other common examples of driving distractions).
20. See Matt Richtel, Dismissing the Risks of a Deadly Habit, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2009, at Al. Studies show that "drivers using phones are four times as likely to crash as
other drivers." Id
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presented an increasing problem in one specific context: distracted
driving.22
In 2008, over five thousand fatal car accidents involved driver
distraction.23 Put another way, sixteen percent of the total number of
reported vehicle-related fatalities involved driver distraction during that
year.24  The automobile crashes associated with distracted driving,
however, are not solely limited to fatalities; over two million people were
injured in motor vehicle traffic crashes in 2008, and twenty-two percent
of those injuries involved driver distraction.2 5
Although these statistics encompass the general ambit of distracted
driving activities, 26 the high volume of drivers who use cell phones has
only exacerbated the distracted driving problem.2 7 Research shows that
drivers who talk on their cell phones are "four times as likely to crash
than other drivers, and are as likely to cause an accident as someone with
a 0.08 blood alcohol content." 28 Even so, sixty-four percent of drivers
who have a cell phone in their vehicle reported that they "always or
usually answer incoming phone calls."29
Text messaging while driving has also proved problematic. One
study suggests that in 2008, text messaging while driving accounted for
an additional three percent of automobile crashes caused by the use of a
cell phone.3 0 Recognizing that the use of cell phones while driving is an
impending problem that threatens the safety of those traveling, several
states have began enacting laws to thwart the substantial number of
automobile crashes that occur each year as a result of cell phone use.
22. Id; see also Matt Richtel, Federal Agency Plans Distracted Driving Forum,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/
politics/05drive. html. The federal government's plan for a "distracted driving
summit ... underscore[s] the growing focus on the dangers of texting and talking behind
the wheel." Id.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 11, at 3. "In those crashes reported to
have involved distraction, 5,870 fatalities (16% of the overall fatalities) occurred." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data shows that out of
2,346,000 injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents, 515,000, or twenty-two
percent of all injuries, involved distracted driving. Id.
26. Id. at 2 (noting that the distracted driving data presented "includes participation
in secondary tasks and cognitive distraction").
27. See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 21. National Safety Council model
estimated that in 2008, cell phone use, including the act of text messaging, was attributed
to 28% of all automobile crashes. Id.
28. See Richtel, supra note 20.
29. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 11, at 6.
30. See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 21.
31. See generally GOVERNOR'S HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, CELL PHONE DRIVING
LAWS (2009), available at http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphonelaws.html





1. Cell Phone Laws
Laws addressing the use of cell phones while driving vary across
jurisdictions.3 2 Currently, six states prohibit all drivers from talking on
handheld cell phones while driving.33 Although these states have made
their cell phone laws applicable only to handheld cell phones, research
shows that "hands-free devices do not eliminate the risks of distracted
driving, and may worsen them by suggesting that the behavior is safe."
Currently, no state bans both handheld and hands-free cell phones by all
drivers, but twenty-one states ban all cell phone use by novice drivers.3 5
The finding that drivers under age twenty constitute the age group with
the greatest proportion of distracted drivers substantiates these age-
specific bans.36
2. Text Messaging Laws
More recently, states have begun to enact laws that prohibit drivers
from text messaging while operating a vehicle. Eighteen states
currently maintain a blanket ban on text messaging for drivers of all
ages,3 8 while nine states prohibit text messaging only by novice drivers.39
These bans have been made in reaction to recent research showing that
text messaging while driving is more dangerous than driving with a 0.08
percent blood-alcohol content.4 0
32. Id.
33. Id California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington,
as well as Washington D.C., ban all drivers from talking on handheld cell phones. Id.
34. Matt Richtel, Drivers and Legislators Dismiss Cellphone Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/technology/19distracted.
html.
35. GOVERNOR'S HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, supra note 31. Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well as Washington D.C., have restrictions on
cell phone use for novice drivers. Id.
36. See DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 11, at 3. Sixteen percent of all drivers under
the age of twenty involved in fatal crashes in 2008 reported distraction while driving. Id.
37. See generally GOVERNOR'S HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N, supra note 31.
38. Id Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington, as well as Washington D.C. have all enacted
a ban on text messaging for all drivers. Id.
39. Id. Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas,
and West Virginia all have laws limiting the text-messaging ban to novice drivers only.
Id.
40. See Richard Chang, The Danger of Texting, N.Y. TIMES, July 28 2009, at A8.
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3. Enforcement and Penalties
State cell phone and texting laws are differentiated based not only
upon the age of the driver, but also the manner in which the laws are
enforced and penalties are assessed.41 Some states with cell phone and
text messaging laws have in place primary enforcement mechanisms
whereby a driver can be ticketed for solely talking on a cell phone or
using the phone to text message.42 In contrast, other states have in place
laws that make using a cell phone or text messaging only a secondary
offense, which means that drivers cannot be ticketed solely for using
their cell phone or for text messaging while driving.43 In these states, the
driver must also be committing another violation, such as speeding,
before a cell phone or text messaging violation will be assessed.4
The penalties imposed for violating state laws that prohibit the use
of cell phones while driving demonstrate the growing recognition of the
serious danger posed by this form of distracted driving. Some states take
this danger as seriously as drunk driving.45 Utah, for example, has the
46most severe penalty for text messaging while driving. In Utah,
someone who is text messaging while driving can be charged with a
misdemeanor and consequently face a maximum of three months in
prison and a maximum fine of $750.47 If someone who is text messaging
while driving causes an injury or death, that person can be charged with a
felony and sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years in prison and
41. See generally GOVERNOR'S HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, supra note 31.
42. Id. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and West Virginia, as well as Washington D.C. all have laws that make it a primary
offense to use a cell phone or text message while driving.
Id.
43. Id. Arkansas makes it a primary offense for bus drivers to use a cell phone and
text message while driving, but cell phone use for novice drivers is only a secondary
offense. Id. Louisiana's cell phone and text messaging laws are also considered a
primary offense for bus drivers, but a secondary offense for all other drivers. Id
Maryland makes cell phone use a secondary offense, but text messaging a primary
offense for drivers. Id. In contrast, New York makes it a primary offense to use a cell
phone while driving, but only a secondary offense to text message while driving. Id.
Finally, Virginia makes it a secondary offense to use a cell phone or text message while
driving, but for bus drivers, the same offense is primary. Id.
44. See Clyde Haberman, Use of Thumbs Confounds Use of Sense, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2009, at A20 (describing the various penalties imposed by laws banning text
messaging while driving).







assessed a $10,000 fine. 48 Text messaging while driving is no longer
considered an "accident," but "inherently reckless" in Utah.49
Other states have taken a milder approach than Utah.o California,
for example, only assesses a twenty-dollar fine for those who are caught
texting while driving.5 1  New York imposes a fine for text messaging
while driving, but because New York is a secondary offense state, this
fine is not imposed unless the driver is also committing another traffic
violation.52 Although differences exist among states in the severity of
penalties assessed, the purpose behind these laws is the same: prevent
future fatalities and injuries by enacting laws that deter motorists from
text messaging while driving.
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
Congress has become increasingly concerned with the dangers
posed by text messaging while driving. 54 Although many states have
enacted laws prohibiting this dangerous driving behavior, other states
have yet to follow suit.55 Consequently, under both its commerce and
spending powers, Congress has put forth a proposal that would allow the
federal government to become involved in the implementation of these
laws.56
The Avoiding Life-Endangering and Reckless Texting by Drivers
Act of 2009 ("ALERT Drivers Act") operates "to ensure minimum
standards of protection" against text messaging while driving.57  If
enacted, the federal government will withhold twenty-five percent of
federal highway funding apportioned to a state each year until such state
48. Id
49. Id. Lyle Hillyard, a Republican state senator in Utah, explains, "If you choose to
drink and drive or if you choose to text and drive, you're assuming the same risk." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123.5 (West 2009).
52. See Haberman, supra note 44.
53. See Richtel, supra note 45.
54. See Avoid Life-Endangering and Reckless Texting by Drivers Act of 2009, S.
1536, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter ALERT Drivers Act]. One study found that
drivers who sent text messages while driving a motor vehicle "had a collision risk that
was 23 times greater while texting as compared to the risk when the operators were not
texting." Id. § 2(9). Another study "found that college students using a driving simulator
were [eight] times more likely to have an accident while texting." Id. § 2(10).
55. See GOVERNOR's HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, supra note 31 (providing information
that shows only eighteen states have enacted laws banning text messaging for all drivers).
56. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 2(16). Cell phones are
"instrumentalities," "channels," and "products of interstate commerce." Id. § 2(1). As
such, Congress has the power to regulate the use of cell phones. Id § 2(2). Moreover,
Supreme Court precedent permits Congress to "condition Federal highway funding on
State compliance with certain conditions." Id. § 2(3).
57. Id. § 2.
2011] 715
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passes a law that both prohibits text messaging while driving and
delineates some minimum penalty that increases for each repeated
offense.ss Once a state meets the requirements under the ALERT
Drivers Act, any funding previously withheld will be apportioned back to
the state.59
The federal government has successfully used its power to set a
uniform standard for one other traffic safety issue: drunk driving.60 In
the drunk driving context, Congress threatened to withhold federal
highway money from states to encourage state legislatures to raise the
minimum drinking age to twenty-one and to adopt a standard blood-
alcohol content level. 6' The passage of the ALERT Drivers Act, with its
provision to withhold federal highway funding, would similarly
incentivize states to enact laws that address the text-messaging
problem. 62
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Constitutionality of the ALERT Drivers Act
South Dakota v. Dole63 provides guidance on evaluating whether the
ALERT Drivers Act will pass constitutional muster. 64 At issue in Dole
was the constitutionality of a federal statute that withheld states' receipt
of federal highway funds until the state raised its minimum drinking age
to twenty-one. The Supreme Court held that, under the Constitution's
Taxing and Spending Clause,6 6 Congress has the power to "attach
conditions to the receipt of federal funds." However, the Court
explicitly stated "[the spending power is . . . not unlimited," but rather is
subject to three restrictions. 8
58. Id. § 167(b)(2)(A)-(B).
59. Id. § 167(c) ("All funds withheld under this section from apportionment to a
State for I or more fiscal years shall be available for apportionment to the State
immediately upon a determination by the Secretary that the State meets the requirement
under paragraph (2).").
60. See Matt Richtel, Department Plans Forum on Driving While Distracted, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2009, at Al 1.
61. Id.
62. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54.
63. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
64. Id
65. Id. at 205.
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
67. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
68. Id at 207.
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First, "the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the
general welfare."' 69 In determining whether the spending power pursues
the general welfare "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress."70 Second, Congress must "unambiguously" condition states'
receipt of federal funds, thereby "enabl[ing] the States to exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation." 7' Finally, "conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs."'72
The ALERT Drivers Act attempts to comply with these three
restrictions. First, withholding federal funding to promote highway
safety must serve the general welfare.73 The Supreme Court has defined
"the general welfare" as a malleable concept that must be tailored to the
current needs of the nation.74 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
Congress retains the discretion to shape the boundaries of the nation's
general welfare as the nation's needs evolve.7 5
Congress has determined that requiring states to enact laws
prohibiting text messaging while driving promotes driver safety on
national highways and roads.76  Research shows that text messaging
while driving poses a serious danger, with drivers exposing themselves
"to a collision risk that [is] twenty-three times greater" than drivers who
are not text messaging.7 7  The dangers posed by drivers who text
message have also emerged as a nationwide problem, which is evidenced
by the numerous state laws already passed that ban the hazardous
behavior. Furthermore, safe travel is one of the main purposes for
which highway funds are used. 7 9  Therefore, enacting the ALERT
Drivers Act as a means to deter text messaging while driving and its
accompanying risks directly promotes the general welfare.so
69. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
70. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
71. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
72. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Mass. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
73. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
74. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641 ("Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.
Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the
well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times.").
75. Id. at 640 (explaining "[t]he discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise ofjudgment.").
76. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 2(15).
77. Id. at § 2(9).
78. Id. at § 2(12)-(14); See also GOVERNOR'S HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N, supra note 31
(providing information about individual state laws that prohibit text messaging while
driving).
79. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
80. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 2.
7172011]1
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The second requirement, that the ALERT Drivers Act must
unambiguously specify the requirements a state law must satisfy to avoid
losing federal highway funding, proves problematic.8 1  The ALERT
Drivers Act sets forth two requirements with which states must comply:
First, a state must enforce and enact a law that, "except in the event of an
emergency, prohibits an operator of a moving vehicle from writing,
sending, or reading a text message using a hand-held mobile
telephone."8 2 Second, a state must impose a minimum penalty when a
driver violates the text messaging law, and the penalty must increase for
repeated offenses. The penalty requirement is concerning, however,
because the ALERT Drivers Act does not clearly and specifically
delineate the penalties that states must adopt.84
In Dole, Congress made the condition upon which a state may
receive funds clear from the outset: a state must either raise its drinking
age to twenty-one or lose a set percentage of federal highway funding.85
In contrast, the ALERT Drivers Act will allow the federal government to
decide at a future date what penalties states must impose against
violators of text messaging while driving laws.8 6 Thus, Congress has not
unambiguously stated the conditions with which states must comply.8 7
The omission of specific penalties may prove critical to the
constitutionality of the ALERT Drivers Act because, as written, states
will be unable to make a knowing choice about whether to enact a law
prohibiting text messaging while driving until a later date.
Although potential problems with the second Dole requirement
exist, there is no indication that the ALERT Drivers Act is "unrelated to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs." 89
Congress' strong interest in safe interstate travel has been frustrated by
the national problem of text messaging while driving.90 The ALERT
Drivers Act remedies the problem by requiring states to impose penalties
81. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(b)(2).
82. Id. § 167(b)(2)(A).
83. Id. § 167(d).
84. Id.
85. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
86. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(b)(2) (stating that "no later than
180 days after the date of enactment" of the ALERT Drivers Act, the Secretary will set
forth the minimum penalties a state must impose to comply with the Act).
87. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
88. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(d); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207
(quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
89. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
90. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 2; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-9
(providing another example of when Congress' goal of safe interstate travel was




upon drivers who text message in their vehicles, thereby discouraging
drivers from engaging in this dangerous behavior.91 Therefore, the
ALERT Drivers Act satisfies the third Dole requirement. 92
As a final matter, the ALERT Drivers Act may also be rendered
unconstitutional because of the amount of federal highway funding the
federal government will withhold under the Act.93 In Dole, until a state
enacted a law that set the minimum drinking age at twenty-one, Congress
94withheld only five percent of the state's federal highway money. The
Supreme Court concluded this was "relatively mild encouragement to the
States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise
choose."95 In contrast, the ALERT Drivers Act will withhold twenty-
five percent of a state's federal highway funds until the state complies
with the Act's requirements. 9 6 Thus, the ALERT Driver's Act creates a
situation wherein "the financial inducement offered by Congress might
be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion."' 97
The impending possibility of losing five percent of federal highway
funding subsequently led every state to enact a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one.98 Based on this result, Congress could probably withhold a
smaller percentage of highway funding to achieve its goal of
incentivizing states to enact text messaging while driving laws.9 9 if
Congress lowers the percentage of funding withheld, the Act would be
more likely to pass constitutional muster under the standards set forth in
Dole.00
B. A Different Approach to Federal and State Laws
Enacting new state laws and proposing federal legislation to address
the emerging dangers of text messaging while driving provides one
avenue for ameliorating the problem. However, these laws alone may
91. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(b)(2).




96. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(b)(1).
97. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
98. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., COMMUNITY HOW TO GUIDE ON
PUBLIC POLICY, app. 7, 1 (2001), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/
alcohol/Community%20Guides%20HTML/PDFs/PublicApp7.pdf.
99. See ALERT Drivers Act, supra note 54, § 167(b)(1).
100. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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not be enough to deter offenders.'0 ' Enforcement issues arise as police
officers struggle to find methods that will more accurately establish a
person text messaged while driving in violation of the law.102
Drunk driving, for example, is easier to detect.103 When assessing
suspected violators of drunk driving laws, police officers can simply use
a Breathalyzer to determine whether the driver in fact has met or
exceeded the blood-alcohol content standard that warrants issuing a
drunk driving violation.104 In contrast, by the time a police officer stops
a driver who appears to be text messaging, the driver likely has already
put the cell phone away. 05  Consequently, establishing grounds that
justify a distracted driving violation can be difficult to prove, and
questions over how best to enforce these laws persist.10 6
One legal scholar, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, has proposed deterring
distracted driving through self-policing.'0 7  The foundational
underpinnings for this proposed program arise from the use of a
"reputation-monitoring regime."'08 Specifically, the use of "How's My
Driving?" placards, which are commonly seen on the bumpers of
commercial vehicles, has resulted in improved commercial vehicle
safety.109  By expanding the use of these placards to all vehicles,
Strahilevitz suggests that the resulting improved roadway safety will
translate to the greater automotive masses as well.'"0
The "How's My Driving?" program traditionally used for
commercial vehicles is straightforward. Drivers call the number
provided on the placard to compliment or complain about the respective
commercial driver's roadway behavior."' A monitoring company
answers these calls, makes a report of the incident, and then provides that
report to the manager of the commercial vehicle." 2 The manager, in
101. See Richtel, supra note 45 (explaining the difficulties of establishing someone
violated a text messaging while driving law).
102. Id. ("[T]here is no immediate test for driving while texting; such drivers could





107. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" For Everyone (And
Everything), 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1699 (2006).
108. Id. at 1704.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1717. "[How's My Driving?] systems could do a much better job of
identifying the worst offenders, even among a much larger population of drivers." Id.




turn, can take action accordingly, such as sanctioning the offending
commercial driver or providing additional safety training." 3
Similarly, the government could mandate that every vehicle contain
a similar "How's My Driving?" placard with "a unique identifier for
each vehicle."I14  The placard would symbolize a type of law-
enforcement badge, essentially transforming "every vehicle into an
unmarked police car.""' As such, drivers could report others' dangerous
driving behavior as it occurs, and the monitoring center would send
offending drivers a periodic invoice with a bill for any fines assessed
against the driver for traffic law violations." 6
The "How's My Driving?" program would also remedy the proof
problem associated with text messaging while driving." 7 For example, if
a collision occurred because a driver was text messaging, the calling
center would "expect to receive several contemporaneous reports" about
the accident." 8 Therefore, numerous callers would report that they saw
the driver text messaging while driving, and these reports would help
prove that the offending driver violated a text messaging while driving
law.'' 9
Despite its potential utility, the "How's My Driving?" program is
not without its limitations. For the program to be effective, drivers must
use their cell phones to report dangerous behavior, which simultaneously
diminishes and perpetuates this mode of distracted driving.' 20
Fortunately, feasible solutions to this problem exist that could resolve the
use of cell phones for reporting. One solution would be to install a
system in every vehicle where, "[b]y pressing a button on their
dashboards and speaking into a steering wheel-mounted microphone,"
drivers would be automatically connected to a calling center.121
Alternatively, a passenger in the vehicle, rather than the driver, could
simply use a cell phone to make the report.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1717.
115. Id. at 1722.
116. Id. at 1719. Strahilevitz describes using a points system where "each motorist
would be allotted a set number of positive and negative points that they could distribute
to other motorists during a particular month." Id. at 1718. If a driver received more
negative than positive points for a given month, that driver would be required to pay a
fine. Id. at 1719. Alternatively, if a driver received more positive than negative points,
then that driver would receive a check as a "reward" for courteous driving behavior. Id.
117. Id. at 1721.
118. Id. Although Strahilevitz envisions this program as applying to all kinds of
driver behavior, this Comment addresses the effect the program would have on the
specific act of text messaging while driving.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1737.
121. Id. at 1717-18.
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The overall outcome of this proposed reporting method is to more
effectively hold drivers accountable for their dangerous behaviors,
ultimately resulting in improved roadway safety. 12 2 The ability of every
driver on the road, not just police officers, to report dangerous driving
behavior ensures that traffic law violations do not go undetected. 12 3 In
the end, the new laws prohibiting text messaging while driving make the
behavior unlawful, and the proposed "How's My Driving?" program
would serve as an effective mechanism for enforcing these laws.
C. Criticisms of Text Messaging while Driving Laws
As newly enacted laws prohibiting text messaging while driving
gain notoriety, criticisms of these laws have naturally ensued. First, the
struggle to define distracted driving has proven problematic.124 While
text messaging remains the current paragon of distracted driving, other
types of distracted driving, such as eating and drinking, have existed for
decades without any legal action taken by the government to remedy
those dangers. 125 Therefore, addressing the problem of text messaging
while driving with laws tailored solely to that act will not remedy the
entire ambit of distracted driving behavior.'2 6
Another criticism of text-messaging laws is whether they are truly
necessary. Reckless driving laws already exist under which drivers can
be held accountable for any harm caused by text messaging while
driving.12 7 Because these reckless driving laws encompass all dangerous
driving behavior, Congress would not have to enact an individual law
addressing each form of distracted driving.1 28 Thus, laws prohibiting text
messaging while driving are essentially superfluous.12 9
122. Id. at 1722. "[P]lacards remind commercial fleet drivers that they are
accountable for behavior that is likely to annoy fellow motorists." Id. at 1712. Similarly,
placards on every vehicle would "result[] in substantial reductions in unlawful or
inconsiderate driving behavior." Id at 1722.
123. Id. at 1721. With police departments placing most of their emphasis on issuing
speeding tickets, "other traffic laws go underenforced." Id. at 1722-23. The proposed
"How's My Driving?" program resolves the underenforcement problem by allowing any
driver to report traffic violations as they occur. Id. at 1722.
124. See Edward Niedermeyer, Editorial: Distracted Driving Ban Faces Distraction,




127. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103.5(a) (West 2009) ("Any person who
drives any vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons
or property is guilty of reckless driving."); FLA. STAT. § 316.192(1)(a) ("Any person who
drives any vehicle in wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property is
guilty of reckless driving.").




Finally, enforcement of laws prohibiting text messaging while
driving remains a pertinent problem. Until a program like "How's My
Driving?" or some other novel method is adopted, traditional law
enforcement methods must suffice.1 30  Police officers have already
expressed the difficulty in proving a driver violated a text-messaging
law, which raises concerns over how efficacious these laws will be in
deterring this dangerous driving behavior.'3 1  At least one critic has
suggested that enacting the ALERT Drivers Act in its current format
would only magnify the enforcement problem because each state would
ultimately bear the financial burden of enforcing its corresponding text-
messaging laws.13 2 As a result, these laws would likely remain a low
priority at the local level due to limited funding.1 3 3
D. Privacy Issues
Finding effective methods for enforcing laws prohibiting text
messaging while driving are only the beginning; these laws implicate
pressing privacy concerns that must also be considered.134 The quickness
and ease with which an offending driver can put away a cell phone
makes it difficult to prove a driver text messaged while driving.'35
However, if police officers were permitted to look at the text messages
on the driver's cell phone, the driver's culpability could be more easily
determined.136
Text messages have already proved useful as evidence in other
contexts.'37 For example, text messages are now being used in divorce
proceedings to prove that a spouse engaged in an extramarital affair.13 8
130. See Strahelivitz, supra note 107.
131. See Haberman, supra note 44 (noting the difficulties police officers have in
identifying someone who is text messaging while driving).
132. See Niedermeyer, supra note 124.
133. Id.
134. See Richtel, supra note 45. "If an officer or prosecutor wants to confiscate a
phone or phone records to determine whether a driver was texting at the time of the crash,




137. See generally Laura Holson, Text Messages: Digital Lipstick on the Collar, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09text.html
(describing the use of text messages as evidence in family law cases).
138. Id. A cocktail waitress presented text messages sent from Tiger Woods,
indicating evidence of an affair. Id. Text messages sent and received on his government-
issued cell phone and pager proved that the former mayor of Detroit, Kwame Kilpatrick
had an affair with an aide. Id.
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In another case, one party offered text messages as evidence to
successfully prove that his spouse had physically abused him. 3 9
Similar to how text messages can provide evidence of an affair or
domestic abuse, text messages are also a critical, if not often the sole,
piece of evidence establishing a person violated a law prohibiting text
messaging while driving.14 0 Unlike the use of text messages in family
law matters, however, there would not necessarily be a need to unveil the
actual text of the message.14' Rather, a police officer would only need to
know the time the driver sent or received the message to charge the
driver with the appropriate text messaging while driving violation. 142
This temporal information could be easily gathered from either the phone
itself or phone records that detail the time text messages were sent and
received.14 3  Additionally, the limited discovery of such information
would serve a legitimate government purpose in promoting highway
safety.144
Although the timing of the text messages could be easily gathered,
the privacy rights drivers have in their cell phones may present a
constitutional obstacle to obtaining that information.14 5 Recently, the
United States Supreme Court decided City of Ontario v. Quon,14 6 a case
involving a government employee's expectation of privacy in text
messages sent during work hours on a government-issued pager.147 The
issue in Quon turned on whether the Ontario Police Department violated
the Fourth Amendment rights of police sergeant, Jeff Quon, when it
"searched" his employer-provided pager by reading the text messages
both sent and received on the pager.148
In reaching its decision, the Court assumed that "the principles
applicable to a . .. search of an employee's physical office" also applied
to a search of an employee's electronic devices.14 9 Accordingly, the
Court noted that while "warrantless searches are 'per se unreasonable
139. See id.




144. See Richard Chang, The Danger of Texting, N.Y. TIMES, July 28 2009, at A8.
Studies have found the dangers of texting while driving to be worse than the dangers of
drunk driving. Id
145. See Richtel, supra note 45.
146. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
147. Id. at 2624.
148. Id. For purposes of its opinion, the Court assumed that "Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the test messages" and that the Ontario Police Department's
"review of the transcript constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth




under the Fourth Amendment,"', 50 an exception exists for searches in the
workplace because of "special needs" arising in that setting.' 5 ' In light
of this exception, the Court held that the Ontario Police Department did
not violate Quon's Fourth Amendment rights because "the search was
motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose" for determining whether
the allotted number of text messages needed to be increased, and the
search "was not excessive in scope."'5 2
Despite the Court's narrow and fact-specific holding in Quon, the
decision can nevertheless be viewed as a general proposition that Fourth
Amendment rights and protections must continue to be accounted for in
non-traditional modes of communication.' 53  The Fourth Amendment
protects a person's privacy "against arbitrary and invasive governmental
acts"-a constitutional guarantee that transcends the employment
relationship presented in Quon.154  Consequently, as courts and
legislatures sculpt the confines of privacy in technology across various
contexts and mediums, including text messaging while driving, Fourth
Amendment protections must remain at the forefront. 55
IV. CONCLUSION
The enactment of seatbelt-use laws proved to be a prelude of traffic
safety concerns to come. Technological advancements have presented a
new frontier of highway hazards that federal and state legislatures must
continue to address. Even with new laws prohibiting drivers from using
cell phones or text messaging while on the road, enforcement remains a
paramount problem. Without an effective method for ensuring drivers
comply with these new laws, their ability to prevent automobile
accidents remains uncertain.
Fourth Amendment concerns will also continue to shape the future
of these new traffic safety laws. As the Supreme Court noted in Quon,
"Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior."' 5 6 Thus, societal norms will bear
heavily on appropriate enforcement methods as expectations of privacy
150. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
151. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725
(1987) (plurality opinion)).
152. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632-33.
153. Id. at 2630. "The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become
clear." Id. at 2629. Accordingly, the Court chose "to dispose of this case on narrower
grounds." Id at 2630.
154. Id. at 2627.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2629.
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in electronic gadgets evolve into the future. As such, legislatures must
search for effective ways to promote highway safety as technology
advances, and courts must ensure that Fourth Amendment guarantees are
not impermissibly infringed upon in the process.
